Virtual Library

More than half a century after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights defined what a human being is and is entitled to, Catharine MacKinnon asks: Are women human yet? If women were regarded as human, would they be sold into sexual slavery worldwide; veiled, silenced, and imprisoned in homes; bred, and worked as menials for little or no pay; stoned for sex outside marriage or burned within it; mutilated genitally, impoverished economically, and mired in illiteracy--all as a matter of course and without effective recourse? 

The cutting edge is where law and culture hurts, which is where MacKinnon operates in these essays on the transnational status and treatment of women. Taking her gendered critique of the state to the international plane, ranging widely intellectually and concretely, she exposes the consequences and significance of the systematic maltreatment of women and its systemic condonation. And she points toward fresh ways--social, legal, and political--of targeting its toxic orthodoxies. 

MacKinnon takes us inside the workings of nation-states, where the oppression of women defines community life and distributes power in society and government. She takes us to Bosnia-Herzogovina for a harrowing look at how the wholesale rape and murder of women and girls there was an act of genocide, not a side effect of war. She takes us into the heart of the international law of conflict to ask--and reveal--why the international community can rally against terrorists' violence, but not against violence against women. A critique of the transnational status quo that also envisions the transforming possibilities of human rights, this bracing book makes us look as never before at an ongoing war too long undeclared.

Social and cultural changes have led to free speech claims being made in novel contexts: to challenge the validity of bans on tobacco advertising, to publish 'kiss and tell' stories about celebrities, and to resist attempts to regulate the Internet. In this fully revised and updated new edition of his classic work, Barendt considers the meaning and scope of freedom of speech. How far should free speech and expression clauses go to protect pornography, commercial advertising, and public meetings on the streets? Does this freedom cover desecration of a national flag? Does it include nude dancing?

Eric Barendt discusses the legal protection of free speech in countries including England, the United States (including recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court), Canada, and Germany. He examines the varied approaches of different legal systems and constitutional traditions to balancing free speech and freedom of the press against rights to reputation, privacy, and copyright, and explores case law in light of the philosophical and political arguments for free speech guarantees.

The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was pivotal in popularizing the use of ‘dignity’ or ‘human dignity’ in human rights discourse. This article argues that the use of ‘dignity’, beyond a basic minimum core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions. The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specific, varying significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled decision-making, dignity seems open to significant judicial manipulation, increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its significant attractions to both judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides a convenient language for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally, highly contingent on local circumstances. Despite that, however, I argue that the concept of ‘human dignity’ plays an important role in the development of human rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed content to human rights but in contributing to particular methods of human rights interpretation and adjudication.

The author argues the concept of human rights is a development of the older notion of natural rights and that the modern understanding of natural rights evolved in the context of the European struggle to legitimate its overseas empires. The French Revolution changed this by, in effect, linking human rights to the idea of citizenship. Human rights were thus tied not only to a specific ethical-legal code but also implicitly to a particular kind of political system, both of inescapably European origin. In both cases, however, being employed was an underlying idea of universality whose origins are to be found in the Greek and Roman idea of a common law for all humanity. He ends by arguing that to defend human rights against its non-Western critics, one must be aware of the genealogy of the concept and then be prepared to endorse an essentially Western European understanding of the human.

This volume aims not to retrace the fairly familiar terrain of establishing the legal character of human rights, or to argue the proposition, now well accepted, that human rights are part and parcel of the discipline of international law, but to consider the influence of human rights and humanitarian law on general international law. Although human rights and humanitarian norms are central to the book, then, it is not a book about human rights and humanitarian law. Rather, it deals with the radiation, or the reforming effect, that human rights and humanitarian law has had, and is having, on other fields of public international law. Because of the peculiarities of human rights law, this influence cannot be taken for granted. It is sometimes said that the elaboration of human rights norms and institutions has produced no less than a revolution in the system of international law. Is this true and if so, in what parts of international law? By examining most of the general areas of public international law, the author attempts to demonstrate that the influence of human rights and humanitarian norms has not remained confined to one sector of international law, and that its influence has spread to many other parts, though to varying degrees

In current political debates, the term “cosmopolitanism” is often used in quite vague ways, as part of sweeping generalizations that might not hold up to closer scrutiny. Imperfect Cosmopolis aims to clarify the meaning of the term by approaching it from a decidedly historical perspective—distinguishing, for example, between types of cosmopolitanism and the development of the concept through the centuries.

The human rights regime adopts a legalist approach to limit the harm the powerful may inflict on the vulnerable The attacks of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing ‘war against terrorism’ test the limits of the legalist approach. Human rights constrain state responses to terrorism more directly than they govern the conduct of terrorists. As a result, the international human rights regime is disadvantaged rhetorically and politically. While substantive human rights standards have not changed since September 11, six possible norm developments may occur: (1) alterations in norms governing the use of force may increase the perceived legitimacy of pre‐emptive defensive action, for example with regard to targeted assassinations; (2) reconceptualization of counter‐terrorism as a new species of international armed conflict may displace human rights law and international criminal law, and substitute new rules that are less detailed than those that apply to conventional armed conflicts; (3) derogation principles may be refined, especially in relation to the temporal element and the non‐derogability of the prohibition on arbitrary detention and of fair trial rights; (4) an increase in the commission of extraterritorial human rights violations may spur the clarification of the scope of human rights treaties ratione loci; (5) the targeting of non‐citizens, Muslims and Arabs may clarify non‐discrimination norms; and (6) exclusion from refugee protection may expand. In institutional terms, the ‘war against terrorism’ has not yet had significant effects, but the following issues are notable: (1) integrating human rights into UN counter‐terrorism initiatives; (2) the aggressive campaign by the United States Government against the International Criminal Court; (3) the tendency toward American exceptionalism; (4) leadership by Europe to preserve human rights principles in counter‐terrorism; (5) increased polarization of UN human rights bodies around the Israeli–Palestinian crisis; (6) silencing of criticism of gross violators in exchange for counter‐terrorist cooperation; and (7) marginalization of human rights treaty bodies as effective monitors of counter‐terrorist policies.